In the original article on the patent-framework I summarized a few points that provided a basis to conclude (1) the current patent-framework is flawed, (2) put forward two preconditions that policy-revisions must meet, (3) defined a proposal to change the patent-framework, and (4) briefly explained why such a change will stimulate progress.
Most people consider patents to have emerged as a means to stimulate inventions. However, this is not the case. Originally, patents have emerged in a two-fold manner. Patents emerged as a reward for providing products or services that were thought of as strategically important (to the kingdom), not necessarily new. Beside, patents (in Italy and England, but also as guilds in the Netherlands) emerged as a means to limit competition and favor some people. This was nothing different, and still is not any different, than a pure form of state-initiated discrimination.
Patents eventually were set – for a period of time, nowadays 20 years – to accommodate inventors to profit from their inventions exclusively. The element of new (to the marketplace, or more practically, new to the patent registry) was added. But, the element of exclusivity remained institutionalized. Continue reading “Part II – Arguing the Patent-Framework”